SOFTWARE & SYSTEMS SECURITY · PROGRAM ANALYSIS & VERIFICATION · SAFETY ASSURANCE FOR AI SYSTEMS

Building practical security guarantees for complex and evolving software and systems.

I am a Postdoc in Prof. Gang (Gary) Tan's group at Penn State CSE.

I earned my Ph.D. from the Computer Science and Engineering Department at The Pennsylvania State University in Dec 2024 (Started Aug 2020). I am very fortunate to be advised by Prof. Trent Jaeger and Prof. Jack Sampson.

I also work closely with Prof. Mathias Payer at EPFL, Prof. Zhiyun Qian at UC Riverside, Prof. Danfeng Zhang at Duke University, Prof. Saeid Tizpaz-Niari at the University of Illinois Chicago, Prof. Bin Li at Penn State, Prof. Mahdi Imani at Northeastern University, Prof. Tian Lan at George Washington University, Dr. Derrick McKee and Dr. Hamed Okhravi at MIT Lincoln Laboratory.

My research develops validation-driven security techniques for software and AI-enabled systems where complete end-to-end verification is often impractical. A central theme of my work is to use program analysis and verification to identify which behaviors, objects, or operating conditions can be trusted, and to focus stronger protection on the remaining security-critical state. This approach enables practical security guarantees without requiring every component of a complex system to be protected or verified in the same way.

I first developed this methodology for software memory safety, where my work determines when memory objects can be safely excluded from expensive protection and concentrates enforcement on the objects that remain vulnerable. I have since extended the same principle to broader systems-security problems and to AI-enabled systems, where assurance must account not only for program behavior but also for learned decision boundaries, uncertain inputs, and deployment variations. Across these settings, my goal is to determine what can be guaranteed, under what conditions, and how those guarantees can be enforced in practice.

On the 2026–27 Faculty Job Market
Kaiming Huang speaking at a conference

Security does not always require proving everything, nor applying protection uniformly.

It requires knowing what is safe, what remains uncertain, and where stronger protection should be applied.

My work began with memory safety, where I developed analyses that identify which memory objects can be proven safe and which still require runtime protection. This makes comprehensive protection practical by concentrating cost only where it is needed.

I have since extended this idea beyond memory safety to software and system security, verification, binary analysis, fuzzing, and AI-enabled systems. Across these settings, I am interested in how partial knowledge can be turned into useful guarantees and how the remaining uncertainty should guide protection and enforcement.

Research Portfolio

From validation to deployable guarantees.

My research asks how strong security and safety guarantees can remain practical when complete verification is infeasible. Across software, systems, and AI-enabled applications, I use analysis and verification to separate what can be trusted from what still requires protection, monitoring, or uncertainty-aware reasoning.

01 / SOFTWARE + SYSTEMS

Validation-driven practical security

Use static and dynamic analyses to determine which program objects, behaviors, and interfaces can be proven safe, isolate the remaining security-critical state, and concentrate protection only where it is needed. The goal is strong end-to-end security guarantees at practical deployment cost.

Memory safety Rust eBPF Compartmentalization Speculative Execution Information Flow
02 / AI-ENABLED SYSTEMS

Verification for deployment

Determine the operating conditions under which learned models can be trusted. I synthesize runtime-enforceable input regions and combine deterministic verification with calibrated probabilistic guarantees to support deployment under uncertain and evolving conditions.

Model verification RNNs / LSTMs Probabilistic guarantees VR / AR safety Human-centered AI systems
03 / INCOMPLETE EVIDENCE

Security reasoning under incomplete evidence

Recover and reason about security-relevant behavior when source-level semantics, execution evidence, or ground truth is incomplete. My work combines binary analysis, postmortem evidence, and testing evidence to distinguish what is known, what remains unresolved, and where residual security risk remains.

Binary analysis Postmortem forensics Residual risk of fuzzing Firmware security Crash diagnosis Indirect-call recovery
What comes next

Continuous assurance for evolving systems and software: develop change-aware incremental analysis that identifies which previously established guarantees remain valid after software updates, which assumptions have been affected, and which parts of the system require selective re-analysis or re-verification. This can avoid repeatedly validating an entire system from scratch as code, dependencies, configurations, and deployment conditions evolve. I also plan to explore validated generative reasoning, where generative AI proposes candidate invariants, attack paths, program relationships, or analysis hypotheses to expand the search space, while independent static, dynamic, and formal analyses validate those candidates before they are incorporated into a security guarantee.

Research artifacts

Systems that make the ideas executable.

Open-source systems, analysis frameworks, and reproducible artifacts developed across my research in software and systems security.

About

Validation-driven practical security across evolving software, systems, and AI-enabled applications.

I am a Postdoctoral Scholar at Penn State, working with Prof. Gang Tan. I earned my Ph.D. in Computer Science and Engineering from Penn State, advised by Prof. Trent Jaeger and co-advised by Prof. Jack Sampson.

My broader goal is to make strong security guarantees usable in real systems: identify what can be proven, isolate what cannot, and connect verification results to practical enforcement.